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et al.: Moghimzadeh v. College of Saint Rose (decided February 6, 1997)

DUE PROCESS

complaint. 2 70 Further, in granting partial summary judgment to
defendants on their counterclaims, the court directed plaintiff to
comply with the statute's reporting requirements. 27 1 Finally,
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on its claims and
272
for dismissal of defendants' counterclaims was denied.

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
273
Moghimzadeh v. College of Saint Rose
(decided February 6, 1997)

Plaintiff, Mahmood Moghimzadeh, was terminated from his
employment as a tenured professor at defendant College of Saint
Rose, a private college, and alleged that he was deprived of his
Federal 274 and State275 constitutional guarantees of procedural
due process. 2 76 The Appellate Division, Third Department,
affirmed the order of the Supreme Court, Albany County which

dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of
action and held that the plaintiff did not have a valid due process
claim absent an indication that the defendant's action of dismissal
277
constituted "meaningful State participation."
The plaintiff argued that, although the defendant college is a
private entity, it is subject to regulation and inspection by the

270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 653 N.Y.S.2d 198 (3d Dep't 1997).
274. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section one provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . .. " Id.

275. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section six provides in pertinent part: "[N]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " Id.
276. Moghimzadeh, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
277. Id. at 199.
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State of New York and by the Board of Regents. 278 This, he
argued, was sufficient to constitute the 'meaningful' state action
necessary to grant him the right to due process in the college's
disciplinary proceedings.279
The Appellate Division, Third
Department promptly rejected this claim and proceeded to
explore the issue of what must be shown in order to constitute

'meaningful' state participation. 2 80

In order to show the state involvement necessary to invoke the
constitutional right of due process, the complaining party must

show more than "mere State regulation" of the challenged private
entity. 2 81 The United States Supreme Court reviewed this same
issue in the case of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 282 In
Jackson, the petitioner brought suit against a privately owned and
278. Id. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 214 (McKinney 1988). Section 214
provides in pertinent part: "The institutions of the university shall include all
secondary and higher educational institutions which are now or may hereafter
be incorporated in this state . . . . The regents may exclude from such
membership any institution failing to comply with law or with any rule of the
university." Id. See also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1988). Section
202 provides in pertinent part: "The University of the State of New York shall
be governed and all its corporate powers exercised by a board of regents...
."
Id. See also N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 215 (McKinney 1988). Section 215
provides in pertinent part:
The regents, or the commissioner of education, or their representatives,
may visit, examine into and inspect, any institution in the university and
any school or institution under the educational supervision of the state,
and may require, as ofted as desired, duly verified reports therefrom
giving such information and in such form as the regents or the
commissioner of education shall prescribe. For refusal or continued
neglect on the part of any institution in the university to make any report
required, or for violation of any law or any rule of the university, the
regents may suspend the charter or any of the rights and privileges of
such institution.
Id.
279. Moghinzadeh, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
280. Id.
281. Id. This principle allowed for the prompt rejection of the plaintiff's
assertion that because defendant was regulated pursuant to the Education Law
and the Board of Regents, the State therein became sufficiently involved with
defendant private entity. Id.
282. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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operated utility corporation for damages and injunctive relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.283 The Petitioner alleged that under
Pennsylvania State law, 284 she was entitled to "reasonably
continuous electrical service,"285 and that the termination of
same for alleged delinquency, 2 8 6 constituted

"state action,"

which deprived her of property without notice or a hearing, and
as such, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's juarantee of due
process. 2 8 7 The petitioner argued that 'state action' was present

in many forms: respondent being a private utility company, was

subject to extensive state regulation, 288 enjoyed a 'monopoly
status'

in the State

of Pennsylvania, 2 8 9 and

furthermore,

performs a 'public function' by providing an essential public

283. Id. at 345. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress ....
Id.
284. Id. at 348 n.2. See PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 66, § 1171 (1959). This
section provides in pertinent part: "Every public utility shall furnish and
maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities ....
Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable
interruptions or delay .... " Id.
285. Jackson, 491 U.S. at 347-48.
286. Id. at 348. Metropolitan was allowed to terminate utility service based
on delinquency under a provision in its general tariff which is filed with the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission. The Commission, in turn, allows
Metropolitan to provide utility service to a vast service area within the state
while being subject to 'extensive regulation.' Id. at 346. This 'extensive
regulation' was essentially the gravamen of petitioner's allegation of the 'state
action' that violated her right to due process of law. Id. at 348. It is worth
noting that the Court did not find that Metropolitan was even required to file
that particular provision in its tariff or that the Commission was even
empowered to reject it. Id. at 355.
287. Id. at 347-48.
288. Id. at 350.
289. Id. at 351.
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service which is required by the State "to be supplied on a
reasonably continuous basis. "290
The Supreme Court rejected each argument and stated that, just
because a business is subject to regulation by the state, that alone
is not enough to transform its action into one of the State for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 2 91 Rather, the appropriate
inquiry should be whether there is a "sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that
of the State itself."' 292 The Court found an insufficient nexus
between the monopoly status of the heavily regulated private
utility company and the challenged action. 293
The Court did not find any evidence that Pennsylvania granted
respondent a monopoly, and even if there were, that fact would
not be determinative of "state action."' 294 Furthermore, with
respect to the argument that the respondent performed a 'public
function' by providing an essential service required by the State,
the Court stated that validity would only attach if Metropolitan
was exercising some power given to it by the State "which is
traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain
.... "295 The Court found that the obligation to furnish service
belonged to the regulation utilities, not on the State.296
Furthermore, because a provision of Metropolitan's tariff stated
that it had the right to terminate service, and this tariff was filed
with the Commission, this was insufficient to constitute "state
action." 297 Mere approval of such a request in Metropolitan's
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
prerogative

at 352.
at 350.
at 351.
at 352.
at 351-52.
at 353.
"[Tihe supplying of utility service is not traditionally the exclusive
of the State . . . . " Id.

297. Id. at 354-55. Metropolitan filed a general tariff (a certificate of
public convenience) with the Public Utility Commission which contained a
provision which allowed for termination of service due to nonpayment. Id. at
354. The Commission never held any hearings with regard-to this provision of
the tariff. Id. The plaintiff contended that the appearance of that provision in
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tariff was unsatisfactory because it had not been shown that the
Commission "put its own weight on the side of the proposed
practice by ordering it . . . [and that therefore] . . . d[id] not
transmute [the] practice initiated by the utility and approved by
the commission into 'state action.'"298 Thus, petitioner was
unsuccessful.
The New York State Court of Appeals has recognized that the
Due Process Clause of the State Constitution "provides a basis to
apply a more flexible State involvement requirement. "299 In
reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals, in Sharrock v. Dell
Buick-Cadillac,30 0 contrasted the language of the Due Process
the tariff constituted "state action" since it could be inferred that the
Commission 'has specifically authorized and approved' the termination
practice. Id. at 348, 354. However, there was no indication that the
Commission required the provision in the tariff, nor was it clear whether the
Commission would have even had the power to disapprove of it. Id. at 355.
298. Id. at 357 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974)).
299. Moghimzadeh v. College of Saint Rose, 653 N.Y.S.2d 198. 199
(1997) (citing Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 379
N.E.2d 1169, 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (1978)). In Sharrock. the plaintiff
brought an action for damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that
her federal and state due process rights were violated by the sale provisions of
the Lien Law because they authorized sale of her automobile without giving
her an opportunity to be heard. Id., 45 N.Y.2d at 157, 379 N.E.2d at 1172,
408 N.Y.S.2d at 42. Plaintiff's automobile was brought to the dealership by
her husband to be repaired, and at the time it was ready to be picked up, the
plaintiffs husband was hospitalized and unable to pick up the car and pay the
bill. Id. at 156, 379 N.E.2d at 1171, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 41. Two months later.
plaintiff received a "Notice of Lien and Sale" from the dealership which
informed her that a possessory lien against the car had been imposed for
nonpayment of the repairs and storage charges. Id. at 156,57. 379 N.E.2d at
1171, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42. Two months thereafter, plaintiff's car was sold
at an auction for less than half of its resale value. Id. at 157, 379 N.E.2d at
1171-72, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The Special Term denied plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment finding that issues of fact were in dispute. Id. at 157, 379
N.E.2d at 1172, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42. The appellate division reversed and
granted summary judgment holding that the sections of the Lien Law
challenged by the plaintiff were unconstitutional. Id. The court of appeals
affirmed. Id.
300. 45 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39. 44
(1978).
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which prohibits a State
from depriving a person of life, liberty, and property), with the
New York State Constitutional Due Process provision and noted
that "[c]onspicuously absent from the State Constitution is any
language requiring State action before an indixidual may find
refuge in its protections." 30 1 However, the court was careful to
note that the recognition does not assert that the Due Process
Clause of the State Constitution eliminates the requirement of
state participation in the challenged activity, but rather, it is just
'more flexible' than the State involvement requirement the
Supreme Court uses with respect to the Federal Due Process
302
provision.
The Sharrock court set forth factors that must be considered in
the aggregate to determine whether a State has reached the
threshold of being 'significantly involved' in the authorized
private activity to constitute 'state action' and therefore require
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
protection. 30 3 These factors include:
[T]he source of authority for the private action; whether the
State is so entwined with the regulation of the private
conduct as to constitute State activity; whether there is
meaningful State participation in the activity; and whether
there has been a delegation of what has traditionally been a
State function to a private person.304
The Sharrock court found that New York State had been
'significantly involved' and had "so entwined itself into the
debtor-creditor relationship as to constitute sufficient and
meaningful State participation which triggers the protections

301. Id. at 160, 379 N.E.2d at 1173, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
302. Id. at 160, 379 N.E.2d at 1173-74, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
303. Id. at 158, 379 N.E.2d at 1172, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43.

The court

noted that "satisfaction of one of the [factors] may not necessarily be
determinative to a finding of State action," because the necessary test is
"significant state involvement."
Id. at 158, 379 N.E.2d at 1172, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 43.
304. Id.
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by

our

Constitution." 3 05

The

demise

of

the

aforementioned pertinent provisions of New York's Lien Laws
was due to New York's refusal to merely follow the common
law, which provided that the state could merely acknowledge the

garageman's right to possession of the vehicle, but instead, New
York had "authorized enforcement of the lien by means of [an]
ex parte sale of the vehicle without first affording its owner an
opportunity to be heard."306
The court found that the
aforementioned sale provisions of New York's Lien Law violated

the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution, in
that they failed to provide the vehicle's

owner with

an

opportunity to be heard "prior to [a] permanent deprivation of a

significant property interest." 307 The court of appeals afforded
the plaintiff greater protection under the New York State
Constitution than under the Federal Constitution because of the
finality of the sale. 3 0 8
305. Id. at 161, 379 N.E.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 44. The court noted
that in New York, "title to an automobile cannot be transferred, and thus a sale
cannot be accomplished under the Lien Law, without registration of the vehicle
by the Department of Motor Vehicles and its issuance of a certificate of title"
(citing Vehicle and Traffic Law, §§ 401, 420, 2104, 2107, 2113-2115, 2117).
Id. at 159 n.2, 379 N.E.2d at 1173 n.2, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 43 n.2. The garage
worker, in order to bring about the involuntary sale, must invoke "[b]oth the
power of the sovereign and the participation of public officials . . . ." Id.
Thus, the court found that the power of the State in utilizing the Lien Law
"may be sufficiently analogous to the issuance of a write by a court clerk to
support a finding of overt State involvement in the garagemen's sale" Id.
(citations omitted). However, since the court found that the challenged
provisions of the Lien Law were unconstitutional, the question of State action
was never decided. Id.
306. Id. at 161-62, 379 N.E.2d at 1174-75, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 45 (emphasis
added).
307. Id. at 166, 379 N.E.2d at 1178, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
308. Id. at 161-62, 379 N.E.2d at 1174-75, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 45. The court
found that:
[N]ew York has done more than simply furnish its statutory imprimatur
to purely private action. Rather, it has entwined itself into the debtorcreditor relationship arising out of otherwise regular consumer
transactions. The enactment of substantive provision of law which
authorize the creditor to bypass the courts to carry out the foreclosure
sale encourages him to adopt this procedure rather than to rely on more
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In Montalvo v. ConsolidatedEdison,309 the appellate division
reversed the lower court's finding and held that the denial of the
plaintiff's application for residential utility service did not
constitute sufficient 'state action' which deprived the plaintiff of
her property rights under both the New York State and Federal
Constitutions' Due Process Clauses. 3 10 The court recognized
that, to show a deprivation of procedural due process as a result
of "state action," there must be a "sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action qf the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that
of the State itself. "311
The Montalvo court relied on the
rationales of Jackson and Sharrock to hold that the denial of the

application for utility services was not a regulation that so
entwined the State of New York that the actions of Con Ed could

sufficiently be deemed State activity.312

The courts have continually recognized that, absent significant
state involvement, students enrolled at a private college have no

procedural due process rights in disciplinary proceedings. 3 13
cumbersome methods which might comport with constitutional due
process guarantees. Indeed, not only does the State encourage adoption
of this patently unfair procedure, it insulates the garageman from civil
or criminal liability arising out of the sale and requires ... the
Department of Motor Vehicles, to recognize and record the transfer of
title ... enabling the garageman to transfer title to a vehicle he would
not otherwise be deemed to own.
Id.
309. 92 A.D.2d 389, 460 N.Y.S.2d 784 (lst Dep't 1983).
310. Id. at 390, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 786. The Special Term predicated
liability on the theory that Consolidated Edison's [hereinafter "Con. Ed."] acts
constituted "State action" for purposes of a due process claim because "Con.
Ed. furnishes power as an agent of the State of New York." Id. at 393, 460
N.Y.S.2d at 787.
311. Id. at 393-94, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 787 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Corp., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
312. Id. at 397, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
313 Moghimzadeh v. College of Saint Rose, 653 N.Y.S.2d 198, 198 (1997)
(citing Mu Chapter of Delta Kappa Epsilon v. Colgate Univ., 176 A.D.2d 11,
578 N.Y.S.2d 713 (3d Dep't 1992)). In Mu Chapter of Delta Kappa Epsilon,
the activities of fraternity were suspended due to a finding by the dean's
investigatory committee that petitioner violated anti-hazing policies. Id. at 12,
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Similarly, the Moghinzadeh court found no reason to apply
different principles to a tenured professor at a private
university. 3 14 Moreover, in the absence of evidence that the
defendant's enforcement of its own internal rules and guidelines
constituted state action, the plaintiff in the private arena has no
15
due process claim. 3

578 N.Y.S.2d at 714. Petitioners were denied "the full panoply of due process
guarantees" because there was no showing that the State was involved in this
private activity. Id. at 13-14, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 715. With that finding, the
court's inquiry was "limited to whether respondent substantially complied with
its published guidelines or rules regarding procedures in a disciplinary
proceeding." Id. at 14, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 715. According to the student
handbook, the respondent "adhered to its own published guidelines" which
therefore rendered petitioner's claim fruitless. Id. at 14, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
See also Beilis v. Albany Medical College of Union Univ., 136 A.D.2d 42,
44, 525 N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (3d Dep't 1988) (holding that "students at public
universities are entitled to due process... [but] students at private universities
cannot invoke such rights unless they meet the threshold requirement of
showing that the State somehow involved itself in what would otherwise be
deemed [a] private activity"). See also Tedeschi v. Wagner College. 49
N.Y.2d 652, 660, 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1306, 427 N.Y.S.2d 760. 764 (1980)
(holding that a private university must follow its published guidelines for
disciplinary proceedings). Under the college's guidelines in Tedeschi, the
plaintiff was entitled to a hearing by the Student-Faculty Hearing Board and a
review of those findings by the president of the school. Id. at 660-61, 404
N.E.2d at 1306-07, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
314. Moghiizadeh, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 199. See also Klinge v. Ithaca
College, 167 Misc.2d 458, 461, 634 N.Y.S.2d 1000. 1002 (Sup. Ct.
Tompkins County 1995) (holding that tenured professor at private college who
was found guilty by the Dean and Provost of plagiarism was not entitled to any
constitutionally protected liberty or property interests because the college is a
private institution not a state actor). The plaintiff's rights, the court held.
could only be found in the college contract of employment which embodied the
personnel manual or handbook. Id.
315. Moglzinzadeh, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 199. See Paolucci v. Adult Retardates
Ctr., 182 A.D.2d 681, 582 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (2d Dep't 1992) (holding that
"[n]either oral assurances ... nor a general provision in an employee manual
were sufficient to limit the defendants' right to discharge the plaintiff at any
time, for any reason .... ."). Although the employer was "subject to State and
local regulation and funding, its action in discharging the plaintiff did not
constitute the requisite 'State action' necessary to invoke due process
protections." Id.
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In conclusion, both Federal and New York law are in accord in
their interpretation of the Federal and State constitutional
provisions of due process. Both note that in order for "state
action" to be present, there must be a "sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that
of the State itself."' 3 16 As mentioned, mere state regulation of a
private entity is not enough to invoke procedural due process
protection. Furthermore, although the language of the Federal
Constitution Due Process Clause differs from its New York
counterpart, 3 17 the Sharrock court determined that the only
consequence of this difference was that the State Constitution is
"more flexible" than the State involvement requirement used by
the Supreme Court when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, an analysis of the Sharrock factors, in aggregation,
determine whether a state has "significantly inVolved" itself in
the private action so as to merit invocation of the fundamental
right of due process of law.

316. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Corp., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974);
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 158, 379 N.E.2d 1169,
1172, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1978). In Sharrock, the court recognized that:
[plurely private conduct ...does not rise to the level of constitutional

significance absent a significant nexus between the State and the actors
or the conduct ... [t]his nexus has been denominated "State action"
and is an essential requisite to any action grounded on violation of equal
protection of the laws or a deprivation of due process....

Id. See also Montalvo v. Consolidated Edison, 92 A.D.2d 389, 460 N.Y.S.2d
784 (1st Dep't 1983).

317 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from depriving a person of
life, liberty, and property while the New York State constitutional Due Process

Clause does not mention the word "State."
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